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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH

SALT LAKE CITY, A
Municipal Corporation,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
CASE NO. 92-0086-CA

vs.
HAROLD BECKSTEAD,
Defendant/Appellant.

Priority No. 2

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
Appeal from the trial court's denial of the Motion to
Dismiss on the Grounds of Pre Text Stop, in a prosecution for
Driving Under the Influence, a Class B misdemeanor, in violation
of Section 12.24.100 of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City,
in the Third Circuit Court, Salt Lake Department, Salt Lake
County, the Honorable Maurice D. Jones, judge, presiding.
STEPHEN P. ZOLLINGER, #5838
Assistant Salt Lake City Prosecutor
451 South 200 East, #125
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Telephone (801) 535-7767
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee
LARRY LONG
L. Long, Lawyer
39 East Exchange Place, Suite 200
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Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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STEPHEN P. ZOLLINGER, #5838
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee
451 South 200 East, #125
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801 )-535-7767
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH

SALT LAKE CITY, A
Municipal Corporation,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

vs.

::

HAROLD BECKSTEAD,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

:

CASE NO. 92-0086-CA

Priority No. 2

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. Section 78-2a-3(2)(d) (1990).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
1.Whether the trial court finding of no pretext stop was "clearly
erroneous"?
2.Whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the trial
court's ruling that Officer Wasden was justified in stopping the
subject vehicle.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
In considering an appeal of a motion to suppress, the Court of
Appeals should give deference to the trial court's findings of
fact, and be governed by a "clearly erroneous" standard.

State

v. Smith, 781 P.2d at 881.
Questions of law which flow from these factual findings are
to reviewed under a "correctness" standard.

State v. Lopez, 181

Utah Adv. Rep. 41, 42; State v. Steward, 806 P.2d 213, 215 (Utah
App. 1991).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The City concurs in appellant's Statement of the Case
except that the charge was based on a violation of Section
12.24.100 of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Officer Wasden was, as stated by appellant, the only
witness who gave testimony at the initial jury setting, however,
in referring to the transcript (hereinafter "T") prepared and
attached to appellant's brief as Appendix 2, it is clear that his
testimony regarding traffic violations was limited to the 300
South intersection and apparent traffic violations. (T. 11)
Officer Wasden testified that he observed the suspect vehicle
weaving back and forth, (T. 12)

stating "I suspected that he may

have been drinking based on the driving pattern I'd seen". (T.
13)
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The trial court found specifically, based on the testimony
of Officer Wasden;
[T]he conditions existing in the way he drove down
the street, I think provided probable cause. The
officer's training and background indicated there
might be a problem with alcohol. I think it f s
soundly based on experience and view, and your
motion (to dismiss) is denied, sir.
(T. 14).
It is clear from the testimony given by Officer Wasden,
that he stopped the suspect vehicle based on his articulated
suspicion that the driver was under the influence of alcohol. (T.
13)

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court, having heard the evidence, ruled properly
in finding that Officer Wasden did not stop the appellant under a
pretext to search in an unconstitutional manner.
The trial court was correct in finding that Officer
Wasden f s stop of the suspect vehicle on the basis of a reasonable
articulable suspicion that the driver was committing a traffic
offense, such as driving under the influence of alcohol, was
proper.

ARGUMENT
I.

THERE CAN BE NO ISSUE OF A PRETEXTUAL STOP WHERE THE
VIOLATION CHARGED IS THE BASIS FOR THE STOP.

Appellee concurs with the appellantf s statement of the
appropriate standard of review.

The "clearly erroneous" standard
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requires the ruling to be reversed if it is against the clear
weight of the evidence or it is apparent that a mistake has been
made.

It does not mean that the appellate court considers and

weighs the evidence de novo or that a ruling may be reversed
merely because the reviewing court may have reached a different
result.

Great weight is still accorded the trial court and its

decision is reversed only if there is inadequate evidentiary
support or a mistake in the law.

State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191,

193 (Utah 1987).
As recently as March of this year, this Court has addressed
the issue of pretext stops, stating that;
the pretext doctrine applies in cases where the officer
claims to have stopped a vehicle for a minor traffic
violation, but where the court determines the stop was not
made because of the traffic violation but rather due to an
unconstitutional motivation and, therefore, the officer has
deviated from the normal course of action expected of a
reasonable officer. State v. Lopez, 181 Utah Adv. Rep. 41,
42, citing State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 978.
This court articulated the pretext doctrine further as;
whether a "reasonable ... officer, in view of the totality
of the circumstances confronting him or her, would have
stopped" the vehicle for the traffic violation absent the
unconstitutional motivation. Id.
The trial court held in this case, that there was no
pretext stop, because the officer acted as any reasonable
officer with similar training and experience would have when
faced with the same circumstances.

This case goes one step

further, however, because the officer in this case had no
unconstitutional motivation, he was completely forthright about
his reason for pulling the vehicle over.
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The finding of facts by the trial court is clearly
supported by sufficient evidence to sustain the denial of
defendant's motion to dismiss on the basis of pretext stop.

II. REASONABLE ARTICULABLE SUSPICION OF A TRAFFIC VIOLATION
IN PROGRESS IS SUFFICIENT TO WARRANT A STOP,
There are numerous reasons an officer might have for
pulling a vehicle over, this court, again in Lopez, identified
three situations where the officer is justified in stopping a
vehicle:
(1) When the officer observes the driver commit a traffic
violation; (2) when the officer has a reasonable
articulable suspicion that the driver is committing a
traffic offense, such as driving under the influence of
alcohol... ; and (3) when the officer has a reasonable
articulable suspicion that the driver is engaged in more
serious criminal activity, such as transporting drugs,
(citations omitted)(emphasis added)
The issue presented by the immediate case pertains to the
second situation, and although presented inappropriately to the
trial court as a question of a pretextual stop, it was addressed
properly by the trial court in it's response as a question of
reasonable suspicion or probable cause.

See generally, State v.

Grovier, 808 P.2d 133 (Utah App. 1991).

The trial court, after

having heard the evidence, ruled that "The conditions existing
... provided probable cause.

The officer's training and

background indicated there might be a problem with alcohol." (T.
14)

The trial court having stated specifically the basis for

its finding that probable cause existed, this Court should
review it under the "clearly erroneous" standard.
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The evidence

in support of the reasonable articulable suspicion or probable
cause is sufficient to sustain the ruling of the lower court.

CONCLUSION
On the basis of the foregoing, the City requests that the
trial court's denial of defendant's motion to dismiss on the
basis of pretext stop be affirmed•

Respectfully submitted this

day of

M~L.

'EPHEN P. ZOLLINGER
STEPHE!
Assistant City Prosecutor
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, 1991.

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the

day of

,

1992, I caused to be delivered, four (4) true and correct copies
of the Brief of Appellee to Larry Long, Esq,, L. Long, Lawyer, 39
Exchange Place, Suite 200, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2705.
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